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On 25 May 2021, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
issued a landmark ruling on the compatibility of systems of mass surveillance with
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the essential elements of which
were first brought to public light by the revelations of whistleblower Edward Snowden
in 2013.
The judgment in the case brought against the United Kingdom, challenged both
the system of bulk interception of cross-border communications set up by the UK,
such as the Tempora programme, and the cooperation in bulk interception and
surveillance with other countries. Most importantly among these countries are the so-
called ‘Five Eyes’, i.e. the United States (using programmes such as UpStream and
PRISM), Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK.
Given the complexity of the judgment, this blog article will limit itself to conveying
the gist of the Strasbourg judges’ ruling with regard to its findings on compatibility
with Article 8 ECHR protecting the right to privacy, and to setting out some first
impressions.
Overall, while the Court has provided some useful standards in relation to mass
surveillance online, the judgment is affected by some key deficiencies that
unfortunately limit considerably its contribution to provide a solution for the current
human rights challenges in the digital sphere.
The Importance of Metadata for Today’s Surveillance Practices
This much awaited judgment is a landmark ruling because the Court, for the first
time, addresses the challenges of mass surveillance carried out not only on data
but also on metadata. Metadata includes information left in the Internet such as the
author of the information, the location, the subject, and other identifiers.
The Court recognizes that its jurisprudence of ten years ago or more, most of which
is based on targeted surveillance on individual communications, cannot stand the
test of the internet revolution, in which “lives are increasingly lived online” (para.
341). The Court recognises the centrality of metadata when dealing with the
Internet, when it finds that “any intrusion occasioned by the acquisition of related
communications data will be magnified when they are obtained in bulk.” (para. 342).
The consequence of this finding, for the majority of the Grand Chamber, is that
end-to-end safeguards are needed, i.e. from the moment of collection of the data
or metadata until the moment of cessation of the surveillance activity on a given
set of information. Further, these safeguards should increase as bulk interception
progresses, based on the assumption that the more advanced it becomes, the closer
it gets to the individual and to the content, hence to “traditional” surveillance.
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Based on this reasoning, the Grand Chamber looks at “whether the domestic legal
framework clearly define[s]:
1. the grounds on which bulk interception may be authorised;
2. the circumstances in which an individual’s communications may be intercepted;
3. the procedure to be followed for granting authorisation;
4. the procedures to be followed for selecting, examining and using intercept
material;
5. the precautions to be taken when communicating the material to other parties;
6. the limits on the duration of interception, the storage of intercept material and
the circumstances in which such material must be erased and destroyed;
7. the procedures and modalities for supervision by an independent authority
of compliance with the above safeguards and its powers to address non-
compliance; and
8. the procedures for independent ex post factoreview of such compliance and
the powers vested in the competent body in addressing instances of non-
compliance.” (para. 361)
Sharing Surveillance: How and When
The Court affirmed that “the transmission by a Contracting State to foreign States
or international organisations of material obtained by bulk interception should be
limited to such material as has been collected and stored in a Convention compliant
manner and should be subject to certain additional specific safeguards pertaining to
the transfer itself” (para. 362). These are circumstances clearly set out in domestic
law; ensuring that the transferring State has in place safeguards against abuse;
heightened safeguards for material requiring special confidentiality; and independent
control.
However, contrary to the standard set out in EU law and by the Court of Justice
of the EU, “[t]his does not necessarily mean that the receiving State must have
comparable protection to that of the transferring State; nor does it necessarily require
that an assurance is given prior to every transfer” (para. 362).
Finally, where intelligence surveillance concerns the UK’s request to obtain
information or to search for information in the data or metadata acquired and stored
by a third country, the Court forcefully stresses that these systems must not result in
any circumvention of the requirements it has set out (para. 497).Therefore, requests
can only be made if there is a basis in domestic law, which must be accessible and
foreseeable and with clear rules “which give citizens an adequate indication of the
circumstances in which and the conditions on which the authorities are empowered
to make such a request … and which provide effective guarantees against the use
of this power to circumvent domestic law and/or the States’ obligations under the
Convention” (para. 497). In addition, there should be independent supervision and
ex post facto review. Once the information is received, the standards set out by
the Court for surveillance carried out by a Contracting Party to the ECHR must be
applied.
Big Brother Must Work
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As is evident, the Court has set some innovative standards to apply the Convention’s
rights, in particular the right to privacy under article 8 ECHR, to the bulk interception
of communications. However, a closer analysis of the judgment – and in particular
the separate opinions – shows that this landmark ruling misses the mark in the era of
Big Data.
First, the judgment is vitiated by an implicit but excessive trust in the intelligence
services and in the Government’s assessment that interception, storage, analysis
and surveillance of data and metadata is essential to protect national security.
The Grand Chamber’s majority does not attempt to assess the veracity of this
sweeping assertion by the UK, with an application of the tests of necessity and
proportionality, but relies blindly on it. This is a conceptual weakness, because once
this premise is accepted, the judges’ reasoning builds on the primary need to make
mass surveillance work.
Secondly, while the criteria established are useful and in part an improvement on its
previous requirements, the Court has mostly conducted an assessment of the UK
regulatory framework rather than of its actual functioning in practice, to the point that
the Court found the existence of a legislation merely prohibiting the “circumvention
of guarantees” to be an effective system to ensure that there is no circumvention of
guarantees (see para. 513).
Thirdly, it is problematic that some of the Court’s criteria for allowing for bulk
interception can be overridden if, “when viewed as a whole, sufficient guarantees
against abuse are built into the system to compensate for this weakness” (para.
370). This exception brings a degree of unpredictability to the system that in itself
defeats the need to set out clear grounds for bulk interception. Both States and the
Court are therefore allowed to carry out a case-by-case assessment for any kind of
surveillance.
Fourth, one of the requirements of the legal framework gives up an essential
guarantee of human rights protection, namely the oversight by the judiciary. While
requiring that an independent authority be involved in the authorisation and ex post
control processes, the Grand Chamber’s majority explicitly excludes that this must
be a judicial authority and allows for “internal” authorities to be envisaged, even if
they must be, at least on paper, “independent of the executive” (para. 359). On this
specific point, the Court of Justice of the EU took a stronger position requiring the
involvement of a judicial authority (see, Schrems II judgment, paras. 186-194).
With regard to foreign intelligence– whether the UK allows foreign intelligence
services to obtain communications or the UK obtains or requests communications
from foreign services – the Court applies lower standards and does not adopt the
protection equivalency system that is provided by EU law. This means that it will be
easier for the UK to request information from, for example the US National Security
Agency, than to acquire it itself, with the only defence for privacy being an a priori
faith in the letter of UK law, which states that “circumventing” national procedure is
prohibited.
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Finally, the Strasbourg judges have clearly avoided the central question of how to
regulate forms of close transnational surveillance cooperation, such as that of the
Five Eyes, that nurture and dispose of entire databases containing a high amount of
the data produced on the Internet.
Too Late and Too Little
In conclusion, although the Grand Chamber’s ruling made modest advances in
protecting human rights on the internet, overall it missed the opportunity presented
by this case to address the technological revolution of the last decade, namely Big
Data.
The Court has recognised the danger, but the solutions it has posited are still based
on the logic of targeted surveillance systems, according to which the level of human
rights protection should increase the more the surveillance is closer to the individual.
Based on this logic, the more a CCTV camera closes on you the more guarantees
you should have to protect your right to privacy.
However, the current Big Data system resembles more to an infinite set of cameras
installed in everyone’s houses, which intelligence services can access on demand.
The failure by the Court to recognise and effectively regulate the moment of data
gathering risks being fatal to the capacity of the guarantee established by the Court
to effectively protect the human rights of people subject to this kind of surveillance.
It is to be hoped that the Court will revisit its jurisprudence in future cases to more
effectively ensure that its jurisprudence provides effective protection to human rights
in relation to the challenges brought by the technologies of today and not those of
the past.
 
Disclaimer: The author is Senior Legal Advisor to the International Commission of
Jurists (ICJ), which has intervened as a third party in the proceedings described.
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